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Comment
The Extent of a Corporation's Ability to
Constitute an Original Source Under the False
Claims Act-Minnesota Ass'n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp.
Emily R. D. Pruisner*
You are sick, tired, and frightened. An anesthesiologist
enters your surgical holding area and reassures you that she will
remain physically present throughout the procedure in case of an
emergency. She accompanies you to the operating room and
gently counts down until you fall trustingly into unconsciousness.
Unbeknownst to you, as soon as the surgery is safely underway,
she exits the operating room for an unknown destination and fails
to monitor your return to consciousness. She finally reappears to
greet you in the recovery area and pauses to fully bill Medicare as
if she had been physically present throughout the entire
operation, resulting in an overcharge to the government for her
services and, consequently, an unnecessary expenditure of
taxpayers' money.
Fraudulent submissions of claims to the government in
situations similar to the scenario just described occur daily
throughout the United States, costing citizens billions of dollars
per year.1 The False Claims Act 2 (FCA) aims to prevent the
submission of such fraudulent claims and recover the damages.3
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2001,
Wartburg College, Waverly, IA. I extend sincere gratitude to all those who
contributed to this Comment, including Professor Brad Clary, Jennifer Jacobs,
Jeffrey Harrington, Lynne Wolf, Mary Pat Byrn, and the remaining members
of the Minnesota Law Review. I dedicate this Comment to my parents, Paul
and Kathy Decker; to my husband, Taylor Pruisner; and to God, who
continues to bless me with the love and support of family and friends.
1. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5268 (estimating that "fraud against the Government could be costing
taxpayers anywhere from $10 to $100 billion annually").
2. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).




As one of its primary vehicles for doing so, the FCA includes qui
tam4 provisions that reward a person who reports fraudulent
claims to the government with a percentage of its monetary
recovery.5 The Eighth Circuit's analysis in Minnesota Ass'n of
Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health System Corp. (Nurse
Anesthetists) involved such qui tam provisions. 6 The Minnesota
Association of Nurse Anesthetists (Association) alleged that a
group of anesthesiologists and hospitals violated the FCA by
mischaracterizing on Medicare claims the anesthesia services
they provided in a manner similar to the scenario just described. 7
In determining whether it could properly exercise subject matter
jurisdiction over the Association's claims, the Eighth Circuit ruled
as a matter of first impression on the correct interpretation of
several key provisions of the FCA's subject matter jurisdictional
requirements, ultimately holding in favor of jurisdiction. 8 The
Eighth Circuit's interpretation not only further deepened the
circuit splits already involving these qui tam provisions, 9 but also
provided a relatively novel holding directly addressing if and
when a corporation can constitute an original source. 10 The
court's analysis and holdings could thus considerably influence
the way subsequent courts interpret the subject matter
jurisdiction provisions and ultimately alter the scope of the
FCA itself.
This Comment uses the Eighth Circuit's holdings in Nurse
Anesthetists to identify the contentious issues surrounding the
4. "Qui tam" originates from the Latin phrase, "[Q]ui tam pro domino
rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which means, "[W]ho as well for
the king as for himself sues in this matter." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1262
(7th ed. 1999); see also United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 736 F. Supp. 614, 615 n.1 (D.N.J.
1990) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 160, 162 n.41 (W. Lewis ed., 1898)), affd, 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir.
1991).
5. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). A qui tam relator can share in ten to twenty-five
percent of the government's recovery of damages. Id.
6. 276 F.3d 1032, 1040-52 (8th Cir. 2002) (providing a history and
analysis of the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the qui tam
provisions of the FCA).
7. Id. at 1037-40. The factual scenario suggested at the onset of this
Comment, however, is merely an example of the claims associated with FCA
suits and not intended to suggest an opinion as to the validity of the
Association's allegations in Nurse Anesthetists.
8. Id. at 1040-51.
9. See infra Part II for a description of many of these circuit splits
currently surrounding the qui tam provisions of the FCA.
10. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048-50.
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qui tam provisions and analyzes in particular the relationship
between the original source provision and corporations. Part I
reviews the historical evolution of the FCA, detailing the
impetus for each set of amendments. Part II provides the
context for the ensuing analysis through an overview of the
various circuit splits that continue to envelop the qui tam
provisions. Part III describes Nurse Anesthetists' place in the
FCA debate. Part IV limits the scope of this Comment to a
critique of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning in Nurse Anesthetists
regarding whether and when a corporation may constitute an
original source under the FCA. This Comment concludes that
while a corporation can constitute an original source of a qui
tam action, it only possesses the direct knowledge required to
qualify as an original source in certain, limited circumstances
not present in Nurse Anesthetists.
I. OVER ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CONTROVERSY-THE
HISTORY OF AND IMPETUS FOR THE FALSE CLAIMS
ACT AND ITS QUI TAM PROVISIONS
Congress enacted the FCA as a broad, remedial statute aimed
at preventing the submission of fraudulent claims for
reimbursement to the federal government. I The FCA imposes
liability upon any person who "knowingly presents, or causes to be
presented, to an officer or employee of the United States
Government... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval."12 The Act, often implicated in situations involving the
11. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5266 (stating that the purpose of the FCA is to "enhance the Government's
ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud against the Government").
Recent case law, however, has suggested that despite Congress's purported
remedial intentions, the statute's current treble damages and large fines render it
.essentially punitive in nature." Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex
rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 784-85 (2000). For discussions on this proposition
and the other issues raised by Stevens, see Kary Klismet, Note, Quo Vadis,
"Qui Tam"? The Future of Private False Claims Act Suits Against States After
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 87
IOWA L. REV. 283, 299-323 (2001); Jaime McMahon, Comment, Qui Tam Can;
Qui Tam Can't: An Analysis of Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1119, 1146-59 (2001).
12. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000). In its 1986 amendments to the FCA,
Congress extended potential liability based on the FCA by broadening the
definition of "knowingly" to a person who harbors merely one of the following
requisite intents: "(1) has actual knowledge of the information; (2) acts in
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or (3) acts in
reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information." Id. § 3729(b).
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fraudulent submission of Medicare claims,13 has assumed an
increasing practical importance to citizens as the amount of
damages incurred through fraudulent practices rises.' 4
Notably, the ability to initiate civil actions against violators of
the FCA is not limited to the federal government. The FCA
provides that a person, often referred to as the "qui tam relator,"
also may bring a civil action against a violator of the FCA both
on his or her own behalf and on the behalf of the federal
government, provided that the individual properly brings the
suit in the government's name.1 5 If successful in the action,
these whistleblowers are entitled to a portion of the
government's damages. 16 In this manner, the Act provides a
powerful monetary incentive for persons to discover and reveal
fraudulent claim submissions.' 7
13. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5269.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained that the proposed 1986
amendments to the FCA were intended to make the statute a more effective
weapon against fraud and suggested a particular need for reform in two major
federal programs: defense and health care benefits. See id. at 1-2, 4, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266, 5269; see also Pamela H. Bucy, Civil Prosecution of
Health Care Fraud, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 693, 693 (1995) (noting that health
care fraud alone is estimated to cost the public almost ninety billion dollars per
year).
14. See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5268.
The Department of Justice estimated fraud as draining one to ten percent of the
entire federal budget, costing taxpayers valuable money and "erod[ing] public
confidence in the Government's ability to efficiently and effectively manage its
programs." Id.
15. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1) ("A person may bring a civil action for a
violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government.
The action shall be brought in the name of the Government."); see also In re
Shimmels, 85 F.3d 416, 419 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
16. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). The FCA grants the government a choice in
whether or not it will proceed in the FCA action. Id. § 3730(c)(3). A qui tam
relator in a civil action through which the government does intervene can
recover up to twenty-five percent of the proceeds, while a relator in an action
in which the government chooses not to intervene can recover up to thirty
percent of such proceeds. Id. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). In both situations, the
percentage of recovery varies with the level of the relator's contribution to the
action, and the relator is entitled to any reasonable expenses, attorney's fees,
and costs incurred in the action. Id.
17. For example, during the fiscal year from October of 2000 through
September of 2001, qui tam relators have collected in excess of $210 million.
Press Release, United States Department of Justice, Justice Recovers Record
$1.6 Billion in Fraud Payments: Highest Ever for One Year Period, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/November/01_civ_591.htm (Nov. 14, 2001).
Additionally, from October of 2001 through September of 2002, qui tam
relators collected more than $160 million. Press Release, United States
Department of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over One Billion in FY
1250
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A. THE ORIGINAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT OF 1863
The importance of these qui tam provisions is illustrated by
the relevant history of the FCA. Qui tam actions migrated to the
United States from England18 and were implemented almost
immediately by the colonial government as a means of
facilitating compliance with the new laws. 19 Qui tam provisions
acquired additional import in the United States when Congress,
at the urging of Abraham Lincoln, enacted the False Claims Act of
186320 as a tool to combat widespread fraud in sales to the
government in the Civil War.21 Congress, angered by the number
of contractors cheating the government during its time of need,22
aimed to create a statute that would effectively curb such fraud by
2002, at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 2002/December/02_civ_720.htm (Dec. 16,
2002).
18. Dan D. Pitzer, The Qui Tam Doctrine: A Comparative Analysis of its
Application in the United States and the British Commonwealth, 7 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 415, 424 (1972) (noting that early cases in the United States "followed
English common law precedent"). During the Middle Ages, England lacked an
organized police force to protect its citizens from fraudulent practices and
other crimes. Id. at 417-18. Therefore, the Crown authorized qui tam actions
through which injured individual citizens could act on behalf of the sovereign
to enforce the law. See Riley v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514, 545
(5th Cir. 1999) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Pitzer, supra, at 417-18). Such
citizens could collect a bounty in recompense for their efforts, thereby creating
a continued incentive for other citizens to bring similar suits. Id. (citing
Pitzer, supra, at 417-18).
19. For example, the colonial government included qui tam provisions
within ten of its first fourteen penal statutes. United States ex rel. Newsham
v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 722 F. Supp. 607, 609 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(citing United States ex rel. Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. 336, 341 (1805)).
20. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696, 696-99 (current version at 31
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733).
21. 132 CONG. REc. 29,321 (1986) (statement of Rep. Glickman); S. REP. No.
99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273.
22. Examples of such fraudulent contractor practices included situations
where "[iflor sugar it [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for
leather, something no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules,
spavined beasts and dying donkeys." Newsham, 722 F. Supp. at 609 (quoting
Robert Tomes, The Fortunes of War, HARPER'S MONTHLY MAG., June 1864, at
228, 228, quoted in 1 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, at 55-56 (1965)). In angered response,
Abraham Lincoln stated, "Worse than traitors in arms are the men who pretend
loyalty to the flag, feast and fatten on the misfortune of the Nation while
patriotic blood is crimsoning the plains of the South and their countrymen are
mouldering [sic] in the dust." Raegan A. McClain, The Government, the
Legislature and the Judiciary-Working Towards Remedying the Problems
with the Civil False Claims Act: Where Do We Go From Here?, 10 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 191, 210 (2001) (citing 89 CONG. REC. 10,847 (1943) (statement of
Rep. Miller)).
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making it costly to perpetrators. 23 Consistent with its English
predecessors, the Act also contained a qui tam provision that
allowed an individual citizen to bring a qui tam action on behalf of
the government.24 As an effective incentive for such individual,
the qui tam relator was awarded a generous fifty percent of the
damages collected but could recover court costs only if successful
against the defendant.25 Following the Civil War, however, the
opportunities to defraud the United States grew as the economy
flourished, 26 and Congress eventually discovered that poor
statutory drafting and overly lenient judicial interpretations
weakened the FCA's effectiveness and created a need for
substantive change. 27
B. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1943
In 1943 the Supreme Court, stressing the remedial nature of
the FCA, held in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess28 that
according to the plain language of the 1943 statute, a qui tam
relator who merely copied allegations relating to the defendant's
fraudulent actions from a criminal indictment and thereby added
nothing to the discovery of the fraud would still be entitled to
recover half of the proceeds collected by the government.29 This
holding essentially allowed an individual to bring a qui tam action
23. See United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 309 (1976) (stating that
"the Act was originally aimed principally at stopping the massive frauds
perpetrated by large contractors during the Civil War"); United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 547 (1943) (noting that one of the Act's chief
purposes was to "stimulate action to protect the government against war
frauds"). The statute imposed double damages and a $2000 civil fine per false
claim on anyone "who shall make or cause to be made.., for payment or
approval.., any claim upon or against the Government of the United
States ... knowing such claim to be false, fictitious, or fraudulent." Act of
Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, §§ 1, 3, 12 Stat. at 696, 698.
24. Act of Mar. 2, 1863, ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. at 698.
25. Id. § 6.
26. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A
Civil War Relic Evolves into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REV. 455, 459
(1998) (citing S. REP. No. 99-345, at 10, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5275).
27. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 11, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5276
(stating that court interpretations of the FCA, such as that expressed in
United States ex. rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), went so far as to
prompt "then Attorney General Francis Biddle to request that Congress repeal
the qui tam provisions of the act"); see also infra notes 28-32 and
accompanying text.
28. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
29. See id. at 545-46.
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and recover a substantial amount of money without effectively
assisting the government in combating fraud.30  In direct
opposition to this ruling and in an explicit effort to curb parasitic
suits, 31 Congress amended the FCA to include additional subject
matter jurisdictional requirements for actions brought by qui tam
relators.32
In one such relevant measure, Congress dictated that a court
presiding over a qui tam action in which the government declined
to intervene 33 would lack subject matter jurisdiction over a qui
tam suit "whenever it shall be made to appear that such suit was
based upon evidence or information in the possession of the
United States, or any agency, officer or employee thereof, at the
time such suit was brought."34 While this provision effectively
limited parasitic qui tam actions, it was unfortunately interpreted
to invalidate legitimate actions as well.35  Thus, courts'
subsequent interpretations of this provision proved overbroad and
frustrated Congress's intent once more, prompting Congress to
again amend and thereby clarify the FCA.
C. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1986
In the years following the 1943 amendments to the FCA, the
30. See Meador & Warren, supra note 26, at 459.
31. "Parasitic" describes situations in which people bring qui tam suits to
the attention of the government based upon information they have read or seen
through publicly available sources rather than upon their own personal
knowledge. See, e.g., Marcus, 317 U.S. at 545-46. A parasitic suit enables people
to profit from a percentage of the FCA damages without providing the government
any original information. See, e.g., Seal 1 v. Seal A, 255 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th
Cir. 2001); United States ex rel. SiUer v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339,
1347 (4th Cir. 1994).
32. See 89 CONG. REC. 10,8467 (1943) (statements of Rep. Walter and
Rep. Miller).
33. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5266, 5277 (interpreting the 1943 qui tam subject matter jurisdiction provision
as applicable only when the government opted not to prosecute the action).
34. Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608, 609 (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 3730 (2000)).
35. See, e.g., Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577
F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1978) (denying subject matter jurisdiction even
when the qui tam plaintiff was the person who originally disclosed the
information to the government); United States v. Aster, 176 F. Supp. 208, 209
(E.D. Pa. 1959) (holding that the FCA's jurisdictional bar is "broad enough to
cover information obtained by the government from any source whatever"),
affd, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1960); see also infra notes 37-41 and accompanying
text.
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number of qui tam actions dropped significantly.36 This reduction
in FCA suits, combined with an appellate decision in 1984,37
provided the final impetus for Congress's 1986 amendments to the
FCA's qui tam provisions.38 In United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean, the Seventh Circuit held that the prior disclosure by the
State of Wisconsin to the federal government of the allegations
underlying its qui tam action barred the state jurisdictionally
from later filing a qui tam suit.39 In a direct response to both
this holding and the amended FCA's decreased effectiveness in
other areas,40 Congress substantially amended the FCA in 1986 to
create a more effective weapon against fraud and enhance the
federal government's ability to recover on its basis.41 Among the
many changes Congress implemented, the amended FCA lifted
some of the restrictions governing its qui tam provisions and
created additional incentives for private individuals to bring qui
tam actions.42 The revised statute bars qui tam claims that are
36. Phillips & Cohen LLP, The False Claims Act: History of the Law, at
http://www.all-about-qui-tam.org/fca-history.shtml (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
37. United States ex rel. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984).
38. See H.R. REP. No. 99-660, at 17-18 (1986) (noting the outdated nature
of some of the FCA's provisions and admitting that evidence of fraud is "on a
steady rise").
39. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1104-07. This case proved even more egregious in
the eyes of Congress, because Wisconsin was statutorily required to disclose
such information to the federal government as a condition of participation in a
Medicare reimbursement program. Id. at 1106. The court deemed the
existence of such a requirement irrelevant for the purposes of the suit, because
Congress held the responsibility to create an exception for such circumstances
rather than the courts. See id. at 1106-07.
40. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12-13 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5277-78 (mentioning United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean as the impetus behind an Attorney General resolution urging a FCA
amendment); H.R. REP. NO. 99-660, at 16-17 (stating that some of the FCA's
provisions were outdated).
41. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266.
Included in its substantive changes, Congress broadened the requisite scienter to
provide that actual intent to defraud is not necessary, clarified the burden of proof
as the lowest standard of "a preponderance of the evidence," extended the FCA's
statute of limitations, and increased the amount of recovery to treble damages plus
$5000 to $10,000 per false claim. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000); see also supra note 12
and accompanying text. For an extended analysis on these revised provisions,
see Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress Giveth and the Courts
Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 380-82 (2002).
42. S. REP. No. 99-345, at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67.
The Senate Committee on the Judiciary specifically noted the importance of
these changes governing qui tam suits in its explanation of the amended
FCA's purpose:
The proposed legislation seeks not only to provide the Government's
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based upon information already publicly disclosed unless the
relator has "direct and independent" knowledge regarding the
alleged falsity of the claims.43  Through this amendment,
Congress attempted to strike the delicate balance between its
competing concerns of encouraging qui tam suits and preventing
the parasitic suits that the 1943 amendments were originally
enacted to curtail.44
The broad 1986 amendments greatly increased the number of
civil suits brought against FCA violators by private citizens.4 5
This increased popularity of qui tam suits consequently stirred
additional controversy and dissention among the courts and
academia regarding the accurate interpretation of the FCA's
law enforcers with more effective tools, but also to encourage any
individual knowing of Government fraud to bring that information
forward. In the face of sophisticated and widespread fraud, the
Committee believes only a coordinated effort of both the Government
and the citizenry will decrease this wave of defrauding public funds.
S. 1562 [the FCA increases incentives, financial and otherwise, for
private individuals to bring suits on behalf of the Government.
Id. One such incentive provided in the amended statute grants protection for
"whistleblowers" who institute qui tam actions against their employers. 31
U.S.C. § 3730(h).
43. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B). Section 3730(e)(4)(A) now provides, "No
court shall have jurisdiction over an action... based upon the public disclosure of
allegations... unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information." Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
The statute later defines the term "original source" as an individual who has
"direct and independent" knowledge of the false claims and voluntary provides
information regarding that knowledge to the government prior to filing suit.
Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
44. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Devlin v. California, 84 F.3d 358, 362
(9th Cir. 1996) (stating that "the FCA has been shaped by Congress's
'[sleeking the golden mean between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing
insiders with genuinely valuable information and discouragement of
opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute of
their own" (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994))).
45. Jack W. Selden & Richard L. Sharff, Jr., Battling David and Goliath-
Defending Qui Tam Lawsuits Brought Under the False Claims Act, 62 ALA. LAW.
326, 327 (2001). For example, the Department of Justice reported that while
only thirty-three qui tam cases were filed in 1987, that number rose to as
many as 533 in 1997. Press Release, United States Department of Justice,
False Claims Act Recoveries Exceed $10 Billion Since 1986, at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/December/02 civ 720.htm (Dec. 16, 2002).
This increased number of qui tam civil suits has likewise led to a larger
monetary recovery by both the government and qui tam relators. See id.
(stating that over six billion of the ten billion dollars recovered by the
government under the FCA since the 1986 amendments were attributable to
actions filed under the qui tam provisions).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
qui tam provisions.46
II. OVER A DECADE OF CONFUSION-COURTS' PRIOR
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE QUI TAM PROVISIONS
Although the 1986 amendments to the FCA were an
attempt by Congress to alleviate the confusion surrounding the
qui tam provisions, they contained their own share of
ambiguous statutory terms. Courts have consequently
contemplated and debated the meaning and breadth of the
FCA's subject matter jurisdiction requirements for years,
creating substantial circuit splits on various jurisdictional
issues.47 These issues can be divided and evaluated on the
basis of three essential questions asked either explicitly or
implicitly by most courts in determining the existence of qui
tam subject matter jurisdiction: (1) whether the allegations of
the relator were "publicly disclosed" prior to the time the qui
tam suit was filed; (2) if so, whether the qui tam suit was
"based upon" that public disclosure; and (3) if the qui tam suit
was "based upon" the public disclosure, whether the qui tam
relator was the "original source" of the allegations underlying
the suit.48 Although this Comment focuses on a corporation's
ability to constitute an original source, courts must address
these first two questions before the third becomes relevant.
Therefore, this Comment will briefly discuss the judicial
interpretive debates raised by each question and then evaluate
whether and when a corporation can constitute an original
source within and outside of the context of Nurse Anesthetists.
46. This Comment does not attempt to exhaustively address all such
controversies, although many of them remain unresolved. For recent valuable
debates regarding issues that extend beyond this Comment's scope, see
generally Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui Tam, 2001 Wis. L.
REV. 381 (2001) (evaluating the constitutionality of qui tam actions under the
FCA, especially in light of certain Article II provisions); Evan H. Caminker,
State Immunity Waivers for Suits by the United States, 98 MICH. L. REV. 92
(1999) (analyzing whether and when qui tam suits can be brought against
states without implicating the defense of state immunity); Frank LaSalle,
Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of
Proof as a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497 (1995) (debating
whether clear and convincing evidence would be a more proper burden of proof
for a FCA action than preponderance of the evidence).
47. See infra notes 49-88 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 859 (7th
Cir. 1999); Cooper v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 565
n.4 (l1th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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A. THE EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
The FCA only imposes subject matter jurisdiction
limitations if the allegations underlying the qui tam action are
"publicly disclosed." 9  Thus, the question of whether a
corporation can constitute an original source does not arise
unless a public disclosure has occurred.50 The Act defines
"allegations or transactions" as publicly disclosed if they are
revealed in a "criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a
congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting
Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news
media."51 Unfortunately, however, the statute does not offer a
definition of the term "public disclosure,"52 and multiple
interpretive debates have arisen due to this omission.5 3
For example, many courts have employed the doctrine of
expressio unius 54 to hold that the jurisdictional bar of the FCA
is invoked only when the allegation or transaction was
disclosed in one of the sources listed in the statute, such as
hearings, reports, or the media.55 These courts have reasoned
that because Congress explicitly enumerated a number of
potential sources of public disclosure, Congress intended for
public disclosure to act as a bar to subject matter jurisdiction
only when the information is publicly disclosed through those
specified sources. 56 Conversely, some courts and scholars argue
that the majority of circuits have historically misinterpreted
this provision by applying the doctrine of expressio unius.57
49. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See id. §§ 3729-3733.
53. See infra 54-64 and accompanying text.
54. Expressio unius, short for "expressio unius est exclusio alterius," is an
interpretive maxim often used by courts that means "the expression of one
[thing] is the exclusion of others." United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485
U.S. 351, 357 (1988).
55. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon
West Inc., 265 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 2292
(2002); A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir.
2000); United States ex rel. Dunleavy v. County of Del., 123 F.3d 734, 744 (3d
Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 913 F.2d 17, 20 (1st
Cir. 1990); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
56. See, e.g., Dunleavy, 123 F.3d at 744; United States ex rel. Williams v.
NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1499-1500 (11th Cir. 1991).
57. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Sci., Inc., 99 F.3d
1000, 1004 (10th Cir. 1996); Robert Salcido, Screening Out Unworthy
Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure
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Rather, they advocate that in enumerating these sources,
Congress merely intended to provide courts numerous
examples of common means of public disclosure. 58
Another source of friction exists regarding whether
information is "publicly disclosed" if it is merely accessible to
the public or if an affirmative act of disclosure must occur in
order for the disclosure to invoke the jurisdictional bar.59 While
some courts have held that theoretically accessible information
is sufficient to constitute a public disclosure, 60 most courts have
rejected this theory, holding instead that "public disclosure
occurs only when the allegations or fraudulent transactions are
affirmatively provided to others not previously informed
thereof."61
A third source of dissention revolves around how broadly or
narrowly to interpret the phrase "upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions. '62 Courts have recently interpreted
this phrase fairly narrowly to the benefit of certain qui tam
relators, specifically querying whether the public disclosure
revealed either the actual "allegations or transactions" that
gave rise to the qui tam relator's claim or mere information. 63
Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 237, 266-68 (1995).
58. See Salcido, supra note 57, at 266-68 But see Williams, 931 F.2d at
1499 (specifically denoting that "[tihe list of methods of 'public disclosure' is
specific and is not qualified by words that would indicate that they are only
examples of the types of 'public disclosure' to which the jurisdictional bar
would apply").
59. Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1157-60 (3d Cir. 1991)
(holding that "potentially accessible" information is publicly disclosed), with
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding a public disclosure when discovery is "actually made
public through filing" with a court, but not when discovery is "only
theoretically available upon the public's request").
60. For example, in United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Insurance Co., the Third Circuit held that two
memoranda produced during the discovery process of a prior suit constituted a
"public disclosure" in a civil "hearing." 944 F.2d at 1157-60. The court based
this decision on the fact that the information contained in the memoranda was
"potentially accessible" to the public and thereby triggered the jurisdictional
bar of public disclosure. See id. at 1158.
61. United States ex rel. Ramseyer v. Century Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d
1514, 1521 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp.,
960 F.2d 318, 323 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14
F.3d at 652.
62. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
63. See, e.g., A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 1238, 1243
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Other courts, however, continue to interpret this phrase in a
broader and more attenuated manner in the interest of
precluding potential parasitic suits, thereby creating yet
another interpretive disagreement among the circuits. 64
B. THE MEANING OF "BASED UPON"
Another issue courts must resolve before they can address
the original source question involves the interpretation of the
phrase "based upon" when determining whether the allegations
or transactions in a suit were "based upon" the prior public
disclosure.65 A minority of appellate circuits have attributed to
"based upon" its plain meaning of "derived from," thus holding
that allegations or transactions can only be "based upon" a
public disclosure if the allegations derive or directly result from
that public disclosure. 66 These courts adhere to the "derived
from" interpretation because it both honors the plain meaning
of the statute and abides by the aim of the 1986 FCA
amendments to encourage and facilitate more qui tam suits
while discouraging parasitic suits. 67
The majority of courts have criticized the minority view,
maintaining that if the allegations underlying the qui tam
action have been previously publicly disclosed, those
allegations are "based upon" the public disclosure even if the
qui tam relator acquired all or part of his or her knowledge
independently. 68 Under this theory, a qui tam suit is "based
(9th Cir. 2000); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 653-56; see also
Salcido, supra note 57, at 261-66.
64. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Jones v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 160
F.3d 326, 331-32 (6th Cir. 1998).
65. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 863 (7th
Cir. 1999); United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d
1339, 1348 (4th Cir. 1994). In other words, if a qui tam relator has derived his
or her allegations from a source independent of the public disclosure, then
jurisdiction does not act as a bar to suit. See id. at 1349.
67. See United States ex rel. Mistick PBT v. Housing Auth. of Pittsburgh, 186
F.3d 376, 394-402 (3d Cir. 1999) (Becker, C.J., dissenting) (citing Siller, 21 F.3d at
1348); Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d at 863; Jones, 160 F.3d at 336 (Gilman, J.,
concurring).
68. See, e.g., Mistick, 186 F.3d at 388; United States ex rel. Aflatooni v.
Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 522 (9th Cir. 1999); United States ex
rel. Biddle v. Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford, Jr. Univ., 147 F.3d 821, 825-
29 (9th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 940-41 (6th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Findley v.
FPC-Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 682-85 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Cooper v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 19 F.3d 562, 567 (11th Cir. 1994) (per
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upon" a public disclosure whenever "the claim repeats
allegations that have already been disclosed to the public."69
These courts therefore attribute to the phrase "based upon" the
meaning "supported by."70 They argue that this departure from
the plain meaning construction of the statute's language is
justified, because the FCA's "original source" exception would
be meaningless if "based upon" were interpreted according to
the minority view. 71 Accordingly, the majority theory gives the
original source exception actual meaning and strikes a better
balance between preventing parasitic suits and encouraging
relators to bring valuable information to the government based
on independent knowledge. 72
C. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN "ORIGINAL SOURCE"
Even in situations where the court determines that the
allegations were both publicly disclosed and based upon the
public disclosure, qui tam relators have one last opportunity to
avoid a jurisdictional bar to their suits if they are the "original
source" of the allegations. 73 The Act later defines an "original
source" as someone who has "direct and independent
knowledge" regarding the allegations underlying the suit and
voluntarily shares such knowledge with the government before
filing suit.74
The determination of what constitutes "direct and
independent knowledge" of the information underlying the
allegations has once again led to dissention among the courts.
curiam); United States ex rel. Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d
Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548, 552-53 (loth Cir. 1992).
69. Biddle, 147 F.3d at 826.
70. See, e.g., McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 940; Cooper, 19 F.3d at 567; Precision
Co., 971 F.2d at 552.
71. See, e.g., Mistick, 186 F.3d at 386-87 (adopting the majority approach
because the minority approach makes the original source language of the FCA
unnecessary); Findley, 105 F.3d at 683 (rejecting the Fourth Circuit's
approach "because it renders the 'original source' exception to the public
disclosure bar largely superfluous"). These courts contend that if a suit need
be "derived from" the public disclosure in order to raise the jurisdictional bar,
then the statute's provision protecting someone who is an original source of
the allegations would be superfluous, because no one could be an original
source if his or her information derived or resulted directly from the public
disclosure. See id. at 683.
72. See Biddle, 147 F.3d at 826-28.
73. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
74. Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
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Many courts have interpreted the language as creating a two-
prong test.75 The first prong requires that the knowledge is
"direct," a term defined by courts in various ways, including
"marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality,
or influence,"76 the plaintiffs "own labor unmediated by
anything else,"77 and "knowledge gained by the relator's own
efforts and not acquired from the labors of others."78 The
second prong requires independent knowledge, a phrase
generally defined by courts as knowledge not derived from the
public disclosure. 79
Some courts have extended the definition of "direct and
independent" beyond a two-prong analysis by requiring either
that a successful relator be a person who actually directly or
indirectly contributed to the public disclosure,8 0 or less strictly,
that the relator must inform the government of the fraudulent
allegations before those allegations are publicly disclosed. 81
75. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d
699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995); Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d
494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989).
76. United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991) (quoting WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 640 (1976)).
77. United States ex rel. Aflatooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d
516, 525 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Devlin v. Cal., 84 F.3d
358, 360 (9th Cir. 1996)); see also Barth, 44 F.3d at 703 (quoting Wang v. FMC
Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir. 1992)).
78. United States ex rel. Fine v. Advanced Scis., Inc., 99 F.3d 1000, 1006-
07 (10th Cir. 1996).
79. See, e.g., Barth, 44 F.3d at 703; Houck, 881 F.2d at 505.
80. See, e.g., Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418-20; United States ex rel. Dick v. Long
Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir. 1990). In defining "original
source," the FCA does not explicitly distinguish between one who has
knowledge regarding the allegations underlying the suit at the time of the
disclosure and one who comes upon such information independently and
directly at a later date. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000) ("For purposes of
this paragraph, 'original source' means an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are based
and has voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action .... "). The Second and Ninth Circuits have suggested that by
adding this distinction their interpretation best effectuates Congress's intent
to reward those who expose the fraud and encourages potential qui tam
relators to come forward with their information at an early time. See Wang,
975 F.2d at 1419; Dick, 912 F.2d at 18.
81. See, e.g., United States ex rel. McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 942 (6th Cir. 1997); United States ex rel. Findley v. FPC-
Boron Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Although these
courts reject the requirement that the original source be the individual who
caused the public disclosure, they have held that recognizing the validity of
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Other courts, however, have dismissed these additional
requirements as unsupported by anything in the statutory
language and unnecessary to protect against parasitic suits.8 2
Most importantly for the ensuing analysis, some
defendants in qui tam suits have further argued that the FCA
mandates that the original source be a natural person. 83 The
rationale for this requirement stems from Congress's
ambiguous use of the term "individual" in the original source
provision in contrast to Congress's more frequent use of the
term "person" throughout the remainder of the relevant
statutory section.84  Historically, statutes and courts have
interpreted "person" more broadly than "individual,"
subsuming within the definition of "person" not only
individuals, but also corporations, associations, and other like
entities. 85  Thus, Congress's use of the term "individual"
only qui tam relators who bring claims to the government before public
disclosure, regardless of whether those relators are responsible for the public
disclosure, best honors the FCA's goal of encouraging relators who bring
fraudulent allegations to the government first while discouraging parasitic
suits by relators who can no longer contribute beneficial information. See
McKenzie, 123 F.3d at 942-43. For an in-depth analysis on this specific debate
regarding the proper original source analysis, see Susan G. Fentin, Note, The
False Claims Act-Finding Middle Ground Between Opportunity and
Opportunism: The "Original Source" Provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(4), 17 W.
NEW ENG. L. REV. 255, 299-301 (1995) (arguing that the FCA's subject matter
jurisdictional requirements are already sufficient to guard against parasitical
suits and therefore preclude the need for a requirement that the qui tam
relator be responsible for the public disclosure).
82. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21
F.3d 1339, 1351-55 (4th Cir. 1994).
83. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548, 553 n.4 (10th Cir. 1992) (choosing not to rule on the defendants' contention
that the corporate plaintiff was not an individual and thus could not constitute an
original source). But see United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v.
Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that a corporation could
qualify as an original source but failing to analyze the effect of Congress's use
of "individual" within the statute).
84. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (stating that original source means "an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to
the Government before filing an action" (emphasis added)); see also id. § 3730
(using the term "person" forty-seven times while using the term "individual" only
once).
85. See, e.g., 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) (defining the term "person" in the United
States Code to include "corporations, companies, associations, firms,
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals"
unless otherwise indicated in the context of a particular statute); Clinton v.
City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428 n.13 (1998) (stating that the term
"person" has generally been construed more broadly than the term
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instead of "person" only once throughout § 3730 of the FCA
when defining an original source has led some attorneys to
argue that original sources can only include natural persons to
the exclusion of corporations and other like entities. 86
Even if one assumes Congress intended that the terms
"person" and "individual" be used interchangeably within the
context of the FCA, this assumption does not resolve the
question of whether a corporation that acts by necessity
through its agents can truly have "direct" knowledge of the
allegations underlying a FCA claim as required by the statute.
In Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. United States and United
States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc., the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits respectively refused to recognize corporations as
original sources because the corporations lacked the requisite
direct knowledge. 87 In United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal
Railway Co. v. Quinn, on the other hand, the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a corporation did have sufficient direct
knowledge to qualify as an original source despite its corporate
status.88 Thus, dissention may exist, or at the very least soon
develop, as to whether and when a corporation can have "direct"
knowledge within the meaning of the FCA's original source
provision.
D. THE NEXT STEP
These circuit splits will continue to widen as more and
more courts rule on the precise jurisdictional restrictions
limiting those bringing a qui tam action. The Eighth Circuit, in
fact, recently ruled on these jurisdictional issues as a matter of
first impression in light of opposing statutory interpretations,
the Act's legislative history, recent case law, and competing
"individual" in the context of the law). Even dictionaries have recognized this
distinction. For example, the American Heritage Dictionary, in defining an
"individual" as "[a] single human considered apart from a society or community,"
indicates that "individual" can signify solely a natural person. AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 893 (4th ed. 2000).
"Person," on the other hand, is generally construed more broadly in legal
terminology. Black's Law Dictionary, for example, defines "person" as both a
human being and "an entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as
having the rights and duties of a human being." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162
(7th ed. 1999).
86. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B); see also supra note 83.
87. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.
1995); Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 554.
88. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14 F.3d at 657.
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policy concerns.8 9 The court's jurisdictional holdings present a
valuable example of contemporary court treatment of the FCA's
qui tam provisions and provide the necessary context for an
analysis of the Eighth Circuit's controversial decision regarding
whether and when a corporation can constitute an original
source.
III. THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT SPEAKS-MINNESOTA ASS'N
OF NURSE ANESTHETISTS V. ALLINA HEALTH
SYSTEM CORP.90
A. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE
In Nurse Anesthetists, the Minnesota Association of Nurse
Anesthetists (Association) initiated a qui tam suit against a group
of anesthesiologists and hospitals alleging that they had
submitted false claims to the federal government for
reimbursement of essentially overcharged and mischaracterized
services in violation of the FCA.91 Although the Association
maintained that it acquired knowledge of these false claims
independently and directly,92 the defendants argued that the
information regarding the allegations had leaked twice to the
public prior to the qui tam relator's filing of the FCA claim,
thereby calling into question the court's subject matter
jurisdiction over the case. 93 In the first instance, the defendants
argued that the Association's allegations had been publicly
disclosed through a 1991 administrative audit.94 The Eighth
89. See Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. A~lina Health Sys. Corp., 276
F.3d 1032, 1040-51 (8th Cir. 2002).
90. This Comment's summary and analysis of Nurse Anesthetists is
limited in scope to the Eighth Circuit's holdings regarding the requirements
and existence of subject matter jurisdiction.
91. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1036-37. The specific allegations
asserted by the Association against the hospitals and anesthesiologists
included billing on a reasonable charge basis while unqualified to do so,
inaccurately billing services as personally performed, misrepresenting the
number of cases handled concurrently, and falsely certifying the necessity of
both an anesthesiologist and anesthetist in medical cases. Id. at 1037-40.
92. See infra Part III.C for the court's later analysis of whether the
Association constituted an original source that possessed such independent
and direct knowledge of the allegations.
93. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1043-44.
94. Id. An audit does constitute one of the means of public disclosure
explicitly enumerated in the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
Therefore, this case did not raise the expressio unius question that other
courts have addressed. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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Circuit, however, concluded that this audit did not constitute a
public disclosure within the meaning of the statute, because the
practices the audit revealed were not the same practices the
Association alleged were fraudulent.95  The second public
disclosure asserted by the defendants and essentially acquiesced
to by the Association resulted from the publicity surrounding the
Association's earlier antitrust suit against the defendants. 96
Various newspaper articles covering the antitrust case had
revealed the allegations underlying the qui tam action prior to the
filing of the action.97 Consequently, the court held that due to the
allegations' prior exposure in the news media, 98 the FCA
allegations were publicly disclosed, thus necessitating further
analysis under the qui tam provisions to ascertain proper subject
matter jurisdiction.99
B. "BASED UPON"
After engaging in a review of the statutory language and
legislative history of the FCA, 100 the court further queried
whether the qui tam lawsuit was actually "based upon" the public
disclosure.' 10 The court determined that if the qui tam lawsuit
was not "based upon" the news media disclosure within the
meaning of the statute, then the plaintiff would prevail as to
subject matter jurisdiction and no further analysis would be
warranted. 10 2  If, on the other hand, the lawsuit actually was
"based upon" the prior public disclosure, then the court would
need to pose the further question of whether the Association
constituted an original source of the allegations underlying the
lawsuit. 103
In its analysis, the court noted that the minority
95. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1044.
96. Id. at 1040, 1043. In 1994, the Association and several others sued
these same defendants in a separate action alleging violations of certain
federal antitrust and state laws stemming from the defendants' billing
practices in the area of anesthesia. Id. at 1040.
97. Id. at 1040, 1043. These newspaper articles were published in early
November, over a month prior to the current suit's filing under the FCA in late
December. See id. at 1040.
98. News media is also a source enumerated in the statute. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A).
99. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1043-44.
100. Id. at 1040-43.
101. Id. at 1044; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).




interpretation of the phrase "based upon" as signifying "derived
from" both adhered to the plain meaning of the statutory
language and met the policy concern of avoiding the parasitic
suits that the 1986 FCA amendments explicitly sought to
prevent. 10 4  Although the court took into account these
considerations, it ultimately followed the majority's practice of
attributing the meaning "supported by" to the phrase "based
upon."0 5  Expressing concern that the minority view's
interpretation of the phrase rendered the statute's "original
source" test useless, 0 6 the court determined that the public
disclosure provision's "overall design" supported the majority
view, arguing that "[t]he 'based upon' clause serves the concern of
utility, that is of paying only for useful information, and the
'original source' exception serves the concern of fairness, that is of
not biting the hand that fed the government the information." 10 7
Because the information underlying the allegations of the current
suit and the information publicly disclosed to the media were one
and the same, the court held that the Association's suit was
"based upon" a previous public disclosure.10 8
C. ORIGINAL SOURCE
Although the Eighth Circuit interpreted the "based upon"
language in the defendant's favor, it determined that the FCA's
"original source" provision afforded the plaintiff one last
opportunity to avoid a subject matter jurisdictional bar.109 Noting
that the original source provision's failure to distinguish between
"those who first bring a claim to light and others who later make
the same discovery independently" may not always protect the
initial discloser of the claim, 110 the court nonetheless refused to
apply the Second and Ninth Circuits' additional requirement that
an original source be the person who caused the public
104. Id. at 1044-45.
105. Id. at 1047.
106. Id. at 1045.
107. Id. at 1047. Thus, the court reasoned that because Congress's ultimate
objective when adopting the 1986 amendments was to achieve a balance
between the competing concerns of utility and fairness, the leniency of the
original source provision justified the majority's more stringent interpretation
of the "based upon" test. See id.
108. Id.
109. Id. ("If the 'based upon' clause threatens to kick relators out of court
because the government does not need them, the 'original source' exception
reopens the courthouse door for certain deserving relators.").
110. Id. at 1048.
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disclosure."' It also refused to follow the District of Columbia and
Sixth Circuits' added requirement that the "relator must have
revealed the allegation to the government before the public
disclosure in order to be an original source." 1 2 According to the
court, such requirements remained unsupported by the statutory
language and contradicted much of the reasoning behind
Congress's 1986 amendments to the FCA.113
The Eighth Circuit also refused to comply with the
defendants' request to impose a separate requirement that the
original source be a natural person.'14 The court cited Clinton v.
City of New York 1 5 for the proposition that the term "individual"
need not be interpreted to include only natural persons if the
statute's context indicates that such an interpretation would be
"absurd."1 6 The court very generally stated that, given the FCA's
statutory language and legislative history, such a result would be
absurd, especially considering that Congress did not otherwise
suggest such a restriction." 17
The Eighth Circuit also held that the original source test
required that the Association's knowledge be both direct and
independent of the public disclosure.118  The court defined
independent knowledge as "knowledge not derived from the public
disclosure,"' 19 and it defined direct knowledge as knowledge
"marked by absence of an intervening agency, instrumentality or
influence: immediate" 20 and "unmediated by anything but [the
plaintiffs] own labor." 121 Although the court easily determined
that the Association's knowledge was of an independent nature,122
111. Id. at 1048 n.11 (citing Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418-20
(9th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912
F.2d 13, 16-18 (2d Cir. 1990)).
112. Id. at 1050-51 (emphasis in original) (citing Findley v. FPC-Baron
Employees' Club, 105 F.3d 675, 690-91 (D.C. Cir. 1997); McKenzie v.
BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 123 F.3d 935, 943 (6th Cir. 1997)).
113. Id. at 1048 n.l, 1050-51.
114. Id. at 1048 n.12.
115. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
116. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048 n.12 (citing Clinton, 524 U.S. at
429).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1048.
119. Id.
120. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)).
121. Id. at 1049 (quoting Wang v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1417 (9th Cir.
1992)).
122. Id. at 1048.
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it devoted more analysis to the question of whether such
knowledge was "direct."123
The defendants based their opposition to the direct nature of
the Association's knowledge on two primary arguments. The
defendants first argued that the Association's knowledge could not
be direct because its knowledge necessarily came from its
members. 124 The court dismissed this argument, holding instead
that an organization's knowledge, though derived from its
members, is neither parasitic nor rendered indirect by any
intervening agency. 125 The court supported this holding by noting
that the Association's status as an unincorporated association
rather than an incorporated entity meant that it had no legal
status distinct from its members. 126 Therefore, its members'
direct knowledge legally constituted the Association's own direct
knowledge.127
The defendants' second argument centered on the earlier
audit conducted of the anesthesiologists' billing practices. 128 The
defendants contended that because the alleged fraudulent billing
practices were revealed through this audit, the anesthetists
derived their knowledge from the audit and thus lacked direct
knowledge of the anesthesiologists' practices. 129  The court
countered, however, that the record indicated personal knowledge
of the anesthesiologists' practices and that a relator need not
possess "personal knowledge of all elements of a cause of action"
in order to rightly qualify as an original source. 130 Thus, the court
held that the Association's knowledge of the allegations
underlying the action was both independent and direct within the
meaning of the FCA.131
Finally, the court decided that the Association fulfilled the
last statutory condition of qualifying as an original source by
voluntarily providing information regarding the defendants'
123. See id. at 1048-50. Perhaps this extended analysis was inspired in
part by the lower court's holding that the Association lacked direct knowledge
because its information came from its members. See id. at 1049.
124. See id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (citing St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union, 102
N.W. 725, 727 (Minn. 1905)).
127. See id. at 1049-50.
128. See id. at 1050.
129. Id.




THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
fraudulent practices to the government prior to filing suit.132
Therefore, the Eighth Circuit held that the Association qualified
as an original source of the allegations underlying the current
action and asserted subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.133
IV. A NEGLECTED REALM-A CORPORATION CAN
CONSTITUTE AN ORIGINAL SOURCE IF ITS
KNOWLEDGE IS SUFFICIENTLY "DIRECT"
A truly comprehensive analysis of every holding and
resolution of circuit splits within Nurse Anesthetists would
necessitate a treatise. Therefore, while this Comment introduces
the many ambiguities, inconsistencies, and disagreements
surrounding the qui tam provisions of the FCA, it does not
endeavor to resolve them all. Instead, the remainder of this
Comment focuses on an in-depth examination of the Eighth
Circuit's decisions in Nurse Anesthetists regarding two arguable
requirements of the original source provision that rarely have
been commented on, much less satisfactorily resolved. These
arguable requirements relate to a corporation's ability to
constitute an original source and the circumstances in which a
corporation's knowledge can truly be direct within the meaning of
the FCA. The court's analysis of both of these issues is
inadequate, and its resolution of at least one issue is incorrect,
thus rendering the court's final decision erroneous.
Debates regarding whether and when a corporate entity can
constitute an original source under the FCA have arisen in
several cases, including Nurse Anesthetists.134 The FCA defines
"original source" as "an individual who has direct and
independent knowledge of the information on which the
allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the
information to the Government before filing an action." 35 This
definition raises three essential issues: (1) as a matter of statutory
construction, whether an entity other than a natural person may
ever constitute an "individual"; (2) if so, whether the term
"individual" should be construed to include entities other than a
natural person in the specific context of the FCA; and (3) if the
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1051.
134. See id. at 1048-50; see also, e.g., Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United
States, 72 F.3d 447, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1995); Springfield Terminal Ry. Co., 14
F.3d at 656-57; United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d
548, 553 n.4, 554 (10th Cir. 1992).
135. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000).
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first two questions are answered in the affirmative, whether the
natural person with information on the fraudulent submissions
must be acting as an agent of the corporate entity at the time that
person acquires such information in order for the corporation's
knowledge to qualify as "direct" under the FCA. The answers to
these questions determine if and when a corporate entity can
constitute an original source under the FCA and thus play an
important role in determining whether a corporate entity in a
public disclosure situation can avoid a jurisdictional bar.
A. AN ENTITY OTHER THAN A NATURAL PERSON CAN
CONSTITUTE AN "INDIVIDUAL"
Courts have historically attributed a broader meaning to the
term "person" than to "individual" when interpreting statutory
language. 136 Even statutes have differentiated between the two
terms, generally defining "person" to include "corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals." 137 In Clinton v.
City of New York, however, the Supreme Court ruled that
despite such traditional differentiation between the two terms,
the term "individual" could and, in the case of the Line Item
Veto Act, should be interpreted synonymously with the term
"person."138 In support of its ruling, the Court noted that the
structure of the Line Item Veto Act clearly indicated that
"Congress did not intend the result that the word 'individual'
would dictate in other contexts." 139  Rather, the Court
determined that construing the Line Item Veto Act to allow
expedited suits for exclusively natural persons rather than
granting that same privilege to corporate entities as well would
produce an "absurd" and "unjust" result.140 Thus, in certain
contexts where it appears Congress did not intend a distinction
136. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
137. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). This first section of the United States Code
provides definitions that are to be applied in the remainder of the Code
"unless the context [of a particular statute] indicates otherwise." Id.
138. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 428-29 (1998). The Line
Item Veto Act contained a provision which explicitly authorized "'[any
Member of Congress or any individual adversely affected' by the Act to bring
an action for declaratory judgment or injunctive relief on the ground that any
provision of the Act is unconstitutional." Id. at 428 (quoting 2 U.S.C.
§ 692(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. II 1997)).
139. Id. at 429 n.14.
140. Id. at 429 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564,
574 (1982)).
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between "individual" and "person" or where such a distinction
seems absurd, "individual" can be construed to include entities
other than natural persons, such as corporations, associations,
or partnerships.'41
B. THE TERM "INDIVIDUAL" SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO
INCLUDE ENTITIES OTHER THAN A NATURAL PERSON IN THE
SPECIFIC CONTEXT OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
In Nurse Anesthetists, the Eighth Circuit in a single footnote
declined to interpret the FCA as requiring that an "individual" be
a natural person. 142  The court cited Clinton for the proposition
that the term "individual" should not be limited to a natural
person if a review of the statute fails to indicate any possible
reason why Congress would intend for only natural persons to
qualify for subject matter jurisdiction to the ultimate exclusion of
corporations and other like entities. 43 According to the court's
analysis of the FCA's history, such an intention to provide natural
persons with special treatment was never expressed and, in the
court's opinion, never contemplated by Congress. 44
The Eighth Circuit's analysis, however, was less
comprehensive than warranted considering the substantial import
of its decision to the ultimate outcome of the case. Because the
court determined that the allegations underlying the present case
had been publicly disclosed 145 and that the present suit was
"based upon" such public disclosure, 146 the court's subject matter
141. See id. It should be noted that Justice Scalia and Justice O'Connor
strongly dissented to the Court's broad interpretation of the term "individual."
Id. at 453-55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia admonished the Court for
being so eager to reach the merits of the case as to ignore the fact that
"corporations, cooperatives, and governmental entities.., are not 'individuals'
under any accepted usage of that term." Id. at 454 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia pointedly referred to 1 U.S.C. § 1 and another definitional
section within the Line Item Veto Act itself, both of which distinguished
"individual" from "person," as evidence of Congress's intent to differentiate
between the two terms. See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Despite his
disapproval of the Court's blatant departure from the plain meaning of the
Act, however, Justice Scalia decided that given the public importance of the
matter, the appellees should be granted expedited review on the basis of the
Supreme Court's Rule 11. Id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
142. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d
1032, 1048 n.12 (8th Cir. 2002).
143. Id. (citing Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429).
144. See id.
145. Id. at 1043-44; see also supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.




jurisdiction rested solely on whether the Association constituted
an original source.147  Had the court held differently and
determined that the FCA's use of "individual" was intended to
include only a natural person, the court would have lacked
jurisdiction, leaving the Association without a recoverable qui tam
claim. Therefore, the importance of this holding, combined with
the interpretive void left by the court's treatment of the original
source issue in a single footnote, necessitates further analysis.
1. Default Rule
The Eighth Circuit cited Clinton to support its proposition
that "individual" should be construed broadly to include
corporations, associations, and other like entities unless an
examination of the statute reveals adequate justification for its
dissimilar treatment of natural persons. 48 The court, however,
misconstrued Clinton by indicating through its phrasing and brief
treatment of the issue that interpreting "individual" to include
corporations and like entities constitutes the default rule rather
than a departure from such. 49 The opposite, however, proves
true. The very first section of the United States Code (USC)
states that "persons" include individuals, corporations,
associations, and other like entities, thus indicating a clear
distinction between the meaning of "individuals" and that of
"persons."150  If "individual" subsumes within its meaning
corporations, associations, and other like entities, then the USC's
inclusion of "individual" in the same list with "corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies" would constitute mere surplusage.
Because statutes are to be construed to avoid surplusage,' 51
such an interpretation proves at the least improbable and at
the most impermissible. Thus, given that the first section of
the USC applies "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of
147. See Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1042 (stating that an affirmative
answer to questions regarding whether the allegations were publicly disclosed
and whether such allegations were based upon the public disclosure meant
that the qui tam relator must be an original source in order for a court to
exercise jurisdiction); see also 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000).
148. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048 n.12 (citing Clinton, 524 U.S. at
429).
149. See id.
150. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
151. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174 (2001) (citing Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995);
Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140 (1994)).
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Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise," interpreting
"individual" to signify only natural persons is the default rule,
and the plaintiff must affirmatively prove to the court why the
context of a particular statute suggests a departure from this
presumption. 152
2. The Supreme Court's Ruling in Clinton
The Supreme Court in Clinton also indicated that the
presumed legal meaning of "individual" does not include
corporations, associations, and other like entities. 153 The Court
stated, however, that the structure and particularly the purpose of
the specific statute in question, the Line Item Veto Act, indicated
that Congress had not intended to distinguish between "person"
and "individual."154 The Court repeatedly stressed that even
though the section of the Act dealing with expedited review
referred specifically to "individuals," the section "evidences an
unmistakable congressional interest in a prompt and
authoritative judicial determination of the constitutionality of
the Act." 155 The Court could not conceive of a reason why, in
light of this explicit purpose, Congress would grant expedited
review to natural persons and not to corporations and other
like entities. 156
The FCA, however, is structured differently from the Line
Item Veto Act in a particularly relevant respect. While the
section of the Line Item Veto Act under review in Clinton had a
single, explicit underlying aim to expedite review in all cases, 157
the FCA is structured to balance two competing concerns. 158
Through the 1986 Amendments to the FCA, Congress
attempted to strike a balance between encouraging additional
152. See 1 U.S.C. § 1.
153. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 428 n.13 (stating that "person" usually has a
broader meaning than "individual" in the law and citing 1 U.S.C. § 1 as proof
of that proposition).
154. Id. at 428-29.
155. Id. In support of its contention that this is the overwhelming purpose
of the Act, the Court cited multiple provisions of the Act, including subsection
(a)(2) which provides that copies of a complaint "shall be promptly delivered,"
subsection (b) which requires that an appeal be filed within ten days, and
subsection (c) which provides that the courts have a duty "to advance on the
docket and to expedite to the greatest possible extent the disposition of any
matter brought under subsection (a)." Id. at 429; 2 U.S.C. § 692 (2000).
156. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429.
157. See id. at 428-29.
158. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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qui tam relators and discouraging parasitic suits. 159 While a
majority of the Supreme Court could not conceive of a reason
why Congress would differentiate as such in the Line Item Veto
Act given its singular principal purpose, 160 more plausible
reasons exist for the distinction under the FCA due to the
competing concerns it attempts to address. 161
In fact, a court only reaches the original source question if
the allegations have already been publicly disclosed and were
based on that public disclosure. 162 In situations where the
allegations have already been public disclosed, the information
the qui tam relator possesses is already available to the
government and arguably of no added utility. Therefore, the
original source provision is an exception granted by Congress in
the interest of preventing unfairness to those who have
acquired their information directly and independently despite
such information's current availability to the government in the
public domain. 163 Congress may have deemed the possibility of
unfairness higher for natural persons than for companies,
associations, or other like entities. Thus, it is not necessarily
"absurd" that Congress, in the interest of balancing the reward
of useful information with fairness concerns, would limit its
"original source" exception to private individuals. Private
individuals come forward with their own information, whereas
corporate entities come forward with the information of their
agents and usually benefit financially from the potential qui
tam reward relatively less than a private individual. 164
159. See supra Part I.C.
160. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 429.
161. See supra Part I.C.
162. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000); see also Minn. Ass'n of Nurse
Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d 1032, 1042 (8th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 1999).
163. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1047. The Eighth Circuit itself
recognized the countervailing concerns that the FCA attempts to address in its
analysis of the correct interpretation of the "based upon" language of the
statute by finding that "[tihe 'based upon' clause serves the concern of utility,
that is of paying only for useful information, and the 'original source' exception
serves the concern of fairness, that is of not biting the hand that fed the
government the information." Id.
164. Granted, the amount of the qui tam reward would be the same
whether bestowed upon a private individual or a corporate entity. See 31
U.S.C. § 3730(d) (providing qui tam rewards to "persons"). This argument
merely points out that corporate entities usually already possess a plethora of
resources and a qui tam reward of $100,000, for example, generally would not
affect their financial status relatively as much as it could positively affect the
financial status of a private individual. Congress has often taken such
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Therefore, the Court's decision in Clinton does not conclusively
determine the correct interpretation of the FCA in light of the
distinct purposes of the Line Item Veto Act and the FCA. The
default rule of differentiating between "individual" and
"person" thus continues to apply unless the specific context of
the FCA indicates otherwise, 165 and the Eighth Circuit's
seemingly complete reliance on Clinton is inadequate.
3. Statutory Interpretation
a. Support for the Plain Meaning of "Individual"
The fact that a differentiation between "individual" and
"person" is not absurd given the FCA's countervailing purposes
does not necessarily signify that Congress intended such a
distinction. Therefore, a more thorough analysis of the FCA's
statutory language is warranted. Although the FCA itself does
not define either "person" or "individual" in § 3730, the
Supreme Court in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v.
United States ex rel. Stevens 166 referred to the Program Fraud
Civil Remedies Act of 1986 (PFCRA) for such definitions when
determining whether "person" in § 3730 of the FCA included
states. 167 According to the Court, the PFCRA is "a sister
scheme creating administrative remedies for false claims" that
was enacted around the same time as the 1986 Amendments to
the FCA.168 The Court accorded great weight to the fact that
the PFCRA did not include a state within its definition of
"person," noting that the PFCRA was intended to act in
conjunction with the FCA and stating that "it is well
established that a court can, and should, interpret the text of
one statute in the light of text of surrounding statutes, even
those subsequently enacted."169  Interestingly, while the
PFCRA's definition of "persons" does not include states, it does
include "any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
considerations into account. See Clinton, 524 U.S. at 454 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "Congress treats individuals more favorably than
corporations and other associations all the time").
165. See supra Part IV.B.1.
166. 529 U.S. 765 (2000).
167. Id. at 786; see also 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6).
168. Stevens, 529 U.S. at 786.
169. Id. at 786 n. 17 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120, 143 (2000); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
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or private organization."1 70 Thus, a statute that the Supreme
Court itself authorized as an accurate source of FCA definitions
explicitly distinguished between the meaning of "individual"
and "person." This indicates that perhaps a similar distinction
should be applied to those terms as used in the FCA.
Portions of the FCA's text also support this distinction.
For example, § 3730 of the FCA, the relevant section regarding
qui tam actions, contains the term "person" forty-seven times
throughout the statute but uses the word "individual" only
once.1 71 This reaffirms the implication offered by the PFCRA
that Congress is not using "individual" and "person"
interchangeably or haphazardly, but is rather pointedly and
purposefully requiring that an original source be a natural
person.
"Individual" is used only twice more throughout the entire
FCA amidst repeated use of "person."172 In § 3733 of the FCA,
Congress uses "individual" when requiring that "[a] verified
return by the individual serving any civil investigative
demand.., or any petition.., setting forth the manner of such
service shall be proof of such service."173 One who physically
serves a petition clearly must be a natural person, and thus
Congress's use of "individual" again supports an argument for
limiting its meaning within the statute to natural persons. The
remainder of the FCA's statutory language, however, proves
less reassuring of a congressional intent to distinguish between
the meanings of "individual" and "person."
b. Support for a Departure from the Plain Meaning of
"Individual"
"Individual" is used once again in the FCA within § 3733 in
a much more ambiguous manner. 174 Under the subsection
Custodians of Documents, Answers, and Transcripts, the
statute states,
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no documentary
material, answers to interrogatories, or transcripts of oral testimony,
or copies thereof, while in the possession of the custodian, shall be
available for examination by any individual other than a false claims
law investigator or other officer or employee of the Department of
170. 31 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(6).
171. See id. § 3730.
172. See id. §§ 3729-3733.
173. Id. § 3733(e) (emphasis added).
174. See id. § 3733(i)(2)(C).
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Justice authorized under subparagraph (B). 7 5
This section essentially states that "individuals" cannot
have access to certain discovery materials unless they are
employees of the Department of Justice. If "individual" is to be
interpreted in this provision as excluding corporations,
associations, and other like entities, then this provision would
seem to imply that while "individuals" cannot have access to
these documents, corporate entities, because they are not
"individuals" according to the default rule, can examine them
at will. Concededly, unlike the reasons supporting the use of
"individual" in the original source provision, there is little
reason why Congress would differentiate as such in this portion
of the statute.176
Thus, Congress's use of "individual" in this provision can
lead to two possible conclusions. Congress may have truly
intended that "individual" and "person" be interpreted
interchangeably throughout the statute, thus according no
significance to its use of "individual" rather than "person" in
the original source provision. Under this argument, Congress's
use of "individual" in this section indicates a need for a
departure from the default rule of attributing separate
meanings to the terms. On the other hand, Congress may have
used "individual" in this specific provision because of its unique
context. The term in this specific provision is qualified by a list
of other individuals: "any individual other than a false claims
law investigator or other officer or employee." 177 Investigators,
officers, and employees are natural persons. 178  Perhaps
Congress, by stating "individual" in this particular provision,
merely did so because its specific context contained immediate
references to natural persons.179 Based on this argument, even
though the default rule provided by the first section of the USC
states that "individuals" and "persons" are distinct in meaning,
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. In fact, such a result would most likely be considered "absurd" under
the analysis of the Supreme Court in Clinton. See Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 429 (1998).
177. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(i)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
178. See supra note 85.
179. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(i)(2)(C). One could also argue that only
individuals can "examine" or look at documents while corporations cannot
because corporations can only "examine" documents through the eyes of their
agents. Multiple statutes within the United States Code, however, refer to a
corporation's ability to examine. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 2277a-8(b)(1)(A) (2000);
id. § 2279aa-5(a)(2)(F); 16 U.S.C. § 831h(b) (2000); 36 U.S.C. § 150104 (2000).
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the context of this particular provision, including the qualifying
language surrounding it and the lack of a conceivable purpose
for making such a distinction here, rebuts such a presumption
in this particular provision without necessarily going so far as
to rebut the presumption in the FCA's other provisions. 180
A few problems, however, exist with this second
interpretation and with the general contention that Congress
intended to attribute a different meaning to "individual" than
to "person." First, § 3733 of the FCA provides numerous
definitions of terms.' 8' Among these definitions, Congress
defines "person" "[flor purposes of this section," to mean "any
natural person, partnership, corporation, association, or other
legal entity, including any State or political subdivision of a
State."182  Thus, in a FCA provision, instead of using
"individual" to signify a natural person, Congress simply used
the term "natural person" to distinguish between corporate
entities and the traditional meaning of individual. 18 3
Congress even applied these particular terms within
§ 3733 by distinguishing between permissible methods of
service for "natural persons" and "legal entities," such as
corporations and associations. 8 4 Even though Congress limited
this particular definition of "person" to only that specific section
of the FCA,18 5 its use of "natural person" instead of "individual"
to describe a human being sheds doubt upon the interpretation
that Congress intended to limit "individuals" to only natural
persons. Had Congress intended to do so, the use of "natural
180. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Such an argument is affirmed by the use of
"person" throughout the remainder of the provision, which states that "[tihe
prohibition in the preceding sentence on the availability of material, answers,
or transcripts shall not apply if consent is given by the person who produced
such material, answers, or transcripts." See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(i)(2)(C)
(emphasis added).
181. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(1).
182. Id. § 3733(l)(4) (emphasis added).
183. The definitions provided by a section within the actual FCA itself
would most likely prove more authoritative as to Congress's intention when
writing the Act than the definitions provided by the PFCRA and supported by
the Supreme Court in a different context in Stevens. See, e.g., Royal Foods Co.
v. RJR Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 1102, 1106 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The first and most
important step in construing a statute is the statutory language itself." (citing
Chevron USA v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984))).
184. See 31 U.S.C. § 3733(d). For example, the title of the section is Service
Upon Legal Entities and Natural Persons. Id.
185. Id. § 3733(1) (stating explicitly that the definitions are solely "[flor
purposes of this section").
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persons" would be unnecessary because the term "individuals"
would convey the same meaning. Given that a similar
argument exists to question why Congress would use
"individual" instead of "person" in select parts of the statute if
both were meant to convey the same meaning, this is certainly
evidence of poor statutory drafting, leaving courts to sort out
Congress's intentions through further examination of the
statute's text and other sources.18 6
Fortunately, § 3730 of the FCA provides some additional
guidance. It not only contains the original source provision, but
also includes another provision that is very influential when
determining the correct textual interpretation of
"individual."'8 7 Subsection (d) of § 3730 provides differing
award amounts to a qui tam plaintiff in an action under which
the government elects to proceed. 88 Generally speaking, a qui
tam plaintiff is entitled to receive fifteen to twenty-five percent
of the proceeds of the FCA action depending on the amount of
the plaintiffs participation or contribution to such action.' 8 9
The subsection further provides, however,
Where the action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on
disclosures of specific information (other than information provided
by the person bringing the action) relating to allegations or
transactions ... , the court may award such sums as it considers
appropriate, but in no case more than ten percent of the proceeds,
taking into account the significance of the information and the role of
the person bringing the action in advancing the case to litigation. 90
This subsection can only apply to those that are original
sources of the allegations, because only an entity that is an
original source can still bring an action if such action is "based
primarily on disclosures."' 91 Yet even though this particular
subsection applies exclusively to original sources, it uses
"person" multiple times rather than utilizing "individual" as
would be consistent with the original source provision of
186. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-65
(1892) (evaluating the legislative history and other sources outside of the
statutory text in order to determine the intention of Congress in drafting the
statute).
187. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
188. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
189. Id.
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. See id. § 3730(d)(1), (e)(4)(A); see also 132 CONG. REC. 29,322 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Berman) (stating that "where the information has already
been disclosed and the person qualifies as an 'original source'. . . the court
may award up to 10% of the total recovery to the qui tam plaintiff').
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§ 3730(e)(4)(B). There is no reason why Congress would refer
to an original source as a "person" in this subsection and thus
allow natural persons, corporations, and other like entities to
collect a reward for their participation in a qui tam suit as an
original source while subsequently limiting an original source
to only an "individual" or natural person in a later subsection.
Thus, this section further supports the interpretation that
Congress did not contemplate excluding corporations and like
entities from the original source exception through its
apparently incidental use of "individual" in the original source
provision.
Finally, the very section of the FCA that contains the
original source provision also strongly suggests that Congress
did not intend to limit the original source exception to only
natural persons. Section 3730(e)(4)(A) provides the statute's
subject matter jurisdictional restrictions and states in relevant
part that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over an action
under this section based upon the public disclosure of
allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by
the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an
original source of the information."' 92 Through this provision,
Congress essentially limits subject matter jurisdiction in a
prior public disclosure situation to an action brought by either
the Attorney General or a "person" that is an original source. 193
Because Congress in this provision explicitly refers to an
original source as a "person" and not an "individual,"' 94 this
subsection, notably situated in the same section as the original
source definition itself, provides a powerful example of
Congress's interchangeable use of "person" and "individual" in
referring to original sources. Thus, this statutory provision
also supports the proposition that Congress did not attribute
special significance to its use of "individual" in § 3730(e)(4)(B),
but rather intended the terms "individual" and "person" to be
used interchangeably and interpreted identically within the
context of this particular statute.
c. A Textual Conclusion
Even though the default rule restricts the definition of
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"individual" to solely natural persons, 195 the textual context of
the FCA, while ambiguous, tends to support a departure from
that default rule. "Individual" is used in the FCA in a context
that implicates that the meaning intended by "individual" is
one typically associated with "person."196 In addition, the FCA
in a definitional section differentiates between "person" and
"natural person," but does not include "individual" within the
definition of "person."197 This shows Congress's affirmative
departure from subsuming the term "individual" into "person"
within this particular Act. Finally, the only other provisions of
the FCA that apply exclusively to original sources refer to such
sources as "person[s]" rather than "individual [s]."1 98 These
arguments combine to tentatively overcome the presumption
for the traditional legal meaning of the term "individual."
Because the statutory language is ambiguous, however, an
evaluation of other interpretive sources is also necessary in
order to ascertain whether Congress truly intended to rebut
this presumption and use "person" and "individual"
interchangeably.
4. Legislative History
The legislative history, however, does not afford courts
much reprise from the confusion the statutory text elicits. The
congressional reports barely mentioned the original source
provision of the FCA, much less explained if any meaning
should be attributed to its use of "individual."1 99 In fact,
nowhere did Congress indicate in the legislative history that it
intended to bar corporations, associations, or other like entities
195. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); see also supra Part IV.B.1.
196. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 181-86 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
199. See S. REP. No. 99-345 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266
(mentioning the original source provision only once throughout the entire
congressional report). Although the Senate Report refers at one point to
individuals as separate from corporations by stating that "the Committee
seeks to halt companies and individuals from using the threat of economic
retaliation," the Report otherwise generally uses the terms "individual" and
"person" completely interchangeably throughout the remainder of the Report,
thus leaving interpreters in the same conundrum. See id. at 34, reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5299 (emphasis added). The House congressional record
does not even mention "individual" in its explanation of the statute, but rather
refers to an original source as a "person." See 132 CONG. REC. 29,321 (1986)
(statement of Rep. Berman).
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from constituting an original source.200
In one pertinent portion of the congressional report,
however, Congress mentioned United States ex rel. Wisconsin v.
Dean as an example of a case restricting the recovery of a qui
tam relator in a manner inconsistent with Congress's intent.201
The report implied, and many courts have held, that Dean's
holding preventing Wisconsin from being a qui tam relator due
to a previous public disclosure that the state itself caused
helped prompt the 1986 Amendments and the original source
provisions. 20 2 The Eighth Circuit in Nurse Anesthetists thus
reasoned that a rule to limit original sources to natural persons
"would have disqualified the State of Wisconsin from
proceeding as relator in Dean and so would defeat one of the
announced motivations behind the 1986 Amendments Act."203
In other words, because Dean, a case in which the relator was
not a natural person, provided an impetus for the original
source provision, Congress most likely would not have passed
an original source provision that essentially invalidated the
state's right, or the right of any unnatural person, to constitute
an original source. 204 At the very least, it is curious that
Congress failed to mention anywhere in its legislative history
the inappropriateness of a state arguing its rights as an
original source if Congress had determined that a state could
not constitute one. 205  Thus, through its very silence, the
legislative history also indicates that the use of "individual" in
the original source provision should be accorded no special
200. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 99-345, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266; 145
CONG. REC. E1546 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Berman); 132
CONG. REC. 29,321 (statement of Rep. Berman).
201. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 12-13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5277-78; see also supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 12-13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 5277-78; Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 794-95 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States ex rel. Lamers
v. City of Green Bay, 168 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 1999); United States ex rel.
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991). In fact, shortly following Dean, the National
Association of Attorneys General passed a resolution encouraging Congress "to
rectify the unfortunate result of the Wisconsin v. Dean decision." S. REP. No.
99-345, at 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5278. The bill that eventually
became the FCA was subsequently drafted. See id.
203. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d
1032, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002).
204. See id.
205. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 8-13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5273-78.
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significance, but rather should be interpreted to include
corporations and like entities. 206
5. Legislative Purpose
Given the ambiguity of the FCA's statutory language and
the disappointing lack of interpretive illumination in the
legislative history, however, determining Congress's intent in
its use of "individual" also requires an analysis of the FCA's
legislative purpose. 20 7 Although an earlier, limited analysis of
the statute's countervailing aims determined that the FCA
passed the Supreme Court's "absurdity" test as laid out in
Clinton,208 it did not reveal whether Congress's overall purpose
supports the reasonable yet controversial contention that
Congress intended for original sources to include solely natural
persons. Thus, further analysis regarding the statutory
purpose is required.
Congress, through its 1986 Amendments, broadened the
qui tam provisions of the FCA in an effort to attract additional
206. This argument involves the "the dog that did not bark" interpretive
canon. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) ("'In a case where
the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so
relatively unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as
detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in
the night."' (quoting Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting))). Under this canon, if Congress had truly passed
an important part of the bill restricting original sources to natural persons, it
is presumed that Congress would have debated such an important restriction
or at the very least referred to it. See id. at 396. Because Congress did
neither, this lends support to the argument that the use of "individual" in the
FCA's original purpose provision was not meant to be especially important or
noteworthy. See id. More recent statements by the drafters of the 1986
amendments to the FCA encourage that the qui tam provisions be interpreted
broadly and thus implicitly affirm this argument for a more inclusive
interpretation of who can constitute an original source. See 145 CONG. REC.
E1546-47 (daily ed. July 14, 1999) (statement of Rep. Berman). In an address
to the U.S. Attorney General, Representative Berman specifically expressed
concern with courts' "crabbed interpretations of the public disclosure bar,"
urging the Attorney General's office to "consider seriously the Department's
obligation to shape the courts' interpretation of the False Claims Act." Id.
207. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-
55 (1989) (stating that although "the words used.., are the primary...
source of interpreting the meaning of any writing," it is nevertheless
important "not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember that
statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose sympathetic
and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their meaning" (quoting
Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir. 1945), affd, 326 U.S. 404
(1945))).
208. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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qui tam relators, hoping to thereby increase exposure of those
submitting fraudulent claims and amplify the amount of
overall damages collected by the government. 20 9 Despite this
desire to increase legitimate qui tam actions, Congress also did
not want people to bring parasitic suits based entirely on
previous public disclosures. 210 The Eighth Circuit noted in
Nurse Anesthetists, however, that an institutional entity's
possession of direct and independent knowledge of the
allegations is generally not any more parasitic than a natural
person's possession of such original source knowledge. 211 Thus,
the interpretation of "individual" as interchangeable with
"person" does not counter Congress's goal to prevent parasitic
suits.
Nor does it counter Congress's competing goal to encourage
persons to become qui tam relators.212 As repeatedly expressed
in the Senate report, the government wants to encourage
people to bring qui tam suits, because qui tam relators help
combat fraud and provide the government with increased
personal and monetary resources. 213 Denying entities other
than natural persons the right to qualify as original sources
could work against this expressed purpose of Congress by
discouraging such entities from revealing the fraudulent
actions of others under the theory that if such information
becomes publicly disclosed, these entities could not qualify to
recover any damages. 214  Because an interpretation of
209. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-
67; see also supra Part I.C (discussing the 1986 amendments generally).
210. See 89 CONG. REC. H10846 (1943) (statement of Rep.Walter); see also
supra Part I.B (outlining the 1943 amendments).
211. Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276 F.3d
1032, 1049 (8th Cir. 2002).
212. See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 1-2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-
67.
213. See id. at 1-2, 6, 8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5266-67, 5271,
5273.
214. Granted, there is a policy argument that Congress may not have been
concerned that corporations, associations, and like entities would become
discouraged, because not every member has personal information regarding
the FCA allegations. Under this argument, Congress expressly used the
original source provision to protect only natural persons in the case of a public
disclosure. If the information of the entity is direct and independent as
required by the statute, however, Congress may indeed have intended to
protect such entities as well. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2000). As
Congress itself noted, the federal government lacks the resources to litigate
every false claim and depends on the time and economic resources of qui tam
relators in cases such as Nurse Anesthetists in which it declines to intervene.
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"individual" as interchangeable with the term "person" does not
hinder or defeat either of the FCA's competing concerns while a
contrary interpretation may do so, the legislative purpose
appears to support this "interchangeable terms" interpretation.
6. Congress Intended a Corporation to Constitute an Original
Source Under Certain Circumstances
The FCA's underlying purposes, combined with its textual
inconsistencies and legislative history, support a departure
from the default rule defining "individual" as solely natural
persons. Even though the Eighth Circuit provided an
inadequate analysis, it was correct in holding that given the
context of the original source provision, Congress apparently
intended to use "individual" and "person" interchangeably
without applicable differentiation in significance. 215
C. A NATURAL PERSON MUST ACQUIRE INFORMATION WHILE
ACTING AS THE CORPORATION'S AGENT IN ORDER FOR THE
CORPORATION'S KNOWLEDGE TO BE "DIRECT" UNDER THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT
Even if pursuant to the above analysis an original source is
not limited to natural persons, the FCA requires that an entity
be more than an "individual" within the context of the statute
in order to constitute an original source. Subsection
3730(e)(4)(B) defines an original source in part as an individual
"who has direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based."216 While the Eighth
Circuit in Nurse Anesthetists contended that there was "no doubt"
that the Association's knowledge was independent from the public
disclosures, 217  the question of whether the Association's
See S. REP. No. 99-345, at 7, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5272 (citing the
"lack of resources on the part of Federal enforcement agencies" as one of the
impetuses for strengthening the qui tam provisions). Thus, discouraging entities
that possess direct, non-parasitic knowledge by denying them the protection of
the original source exception would work against Congress's express intention
to encourage additional qui tam relators and the valuable resources they
provide. See id. at 6-8, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5271-73. In
addition, Congress has already provided additional protection for natural
persons against possible retaliation from employers with a separate provision
protecting employees' jobs when they instigate a qui tam action against their
employers. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
215. See Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048 n.12.
216. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
217. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048.
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knowledge was "direct" required a more extensive analysis.218
The Eighth Circuit cited multiple definitions of "direct" and
settled on two219 that particularly reflect Congress's intent to
"avoid parasitical suits in which the plaintiff contributed
nothing. 220 These definitions included "marked by absence of an
intervening agency, instrumentality or influence: immediate"221
and "unmediated by anything but [the plaintiffs] own labor."222
The district court held that the Association lacked such direct
knowledge and hence did not constitute an original source because
its knowledge was derived from its members.223 In support of its
ruling, the district court cited both United States ex rel. Precision
Co. v. Koch Industries, Inc.224 and Federal Recovery Services, Inc.
v. United States225 as cases in which the circuit courts refused to
recognize corporations as original sources because they lacked the
requisite direct knowledge.226 The Eighth Circuit, however,
distinguished these cases on essentially two different bases,
consequently holding that the Association's knowledge was
direct.227
As one of its bases, the Eighth Circuit stated that the qui tam
plaintiff in the current case differed from the plaintiffs in Federal
Recovery Services, Inc. and Precision Co. in that the Association
was an unincorporated association while the plaintiffs in the other
two cases were corporations. 228 The court attributed considerable
significance to the fact that unlike corporations, "a voluntary
unincorporated association has no legal status separate from its
members. 2 29  The court additionally noted that because
unincorporated associations' rights are derived from their
members' rights, they have "standing to assert their members'
218. Id. at 1048-50.
219. Id. at 1048-49.
220. Id. at 1049.
221. Id. at 1048 (quoting United States ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin &
Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)).
222. Id. at 1049 (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Barth
v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995)).
223. Id.
224. 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992).
225. 72 F.3d 447 (5th Cir. 1995).
226. See Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1049; see also Precision Co., 971
F.2d at 554; Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 72 F.3d at 452.
227. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1049-50.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1049 (citing St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders' Union
No. 37, 102 N.W. 725, 727 (Minn. 1905)).
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rights in court,"2 30 while corporations lack such standing.231
Therefore, according to the Eighth Circuit, an unincorporated
association's knowledge is not parasitic and hence direct within
the meaning of the FCA.232
Although this analysis may be legally correct, it is factually
wrong. The plaintiff in Nurse Anesthetists, referred to throughout
this Comment as the "Association" for purposes of brevity, is
actually an incorporated, nonprofit entity, not an unincorporated
association.233 Therefore, the court's legal analysis in many ways
works counter to its ultimate holding. According to the court
itself, as a corporate entity, the Association has a legal status
separate from its members and does not have standing to assert
the rights belonging to them.234 This implies a much more
attenuated connection between the Association and its members
than the court had assumed in holding that the Association's
knowledge was direct.
The court's second basis for distinguishing Federal Recovery
Services, Inc. and Precision Co. from Nurse Anesthetists rested on
the differences in the timing of the qui tam plaintiffs'
incorporations.2 35 In both Federal Recovery Services, Inc. and
Precision Co., the corporations' members acquired the knowledge
underlying the allegations and later formed the corporations that
eventually brought the qui tam actions,236 whereas in Nurse
Anesthetists, the corporation was formed prior to its members'
acquisition of knowledge regarding the defendants' fraudulent
claim submissions. 237 The Eighth Circuit cited this difference in
the timing of the incorporations as the cause for the other circuits'
230. Id. at 1050.
231. Id. at 1049-50 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed.
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 448 n.10 (2001); United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 551-53 (1996);
Waseca Co. Bank v. McKenna, 21 N.W. 556, 556 (Minn. 1885)).
232. Id. at 1050.
233. See Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State, Filing Number N-208,
Original Date of Filing Apr. 7, 1975, Date of Last Annual Filing 2001, at
http://da.sos.state.mn.us/minnesota/home/dahome.asp (last visited Jan. 27,
2003) [hereinafter Filing Number N-208]; see also Minnesota Association of
Nurse Anesthetists Bylaws, http://www.mnana.org/rules/Bylaws.pdf (1999).
234. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1049-50.
235. See id. at 1049.
236. Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 554
(10th Cir. 1992).
237. See Filing Number N-208, supra note 233.
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holdings that the corporations' knowledge was not direct.238 The
court further noted that in United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Railway Co. v. Quinn, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that a corporation had sufficient direct knowledge to qualify
as an original source despite its corporate status.239 Resting on
this holding and the lack of any evidenced congressional intent
disqualifying corporate relators, the Eighth Circuit stated that
"[t]hough organizations must, of course, act through agents, this
does not render their knowledge parasitic or their agency
'intervening' in the sense of interrupting the causal connection
between the corporation's efforts and the knowledge."240
In the case of the Association, however, the nurse
anesthetists were not acting as agents of the Association when
they acquired knowledge regarding the allegations underlying the
qui tam action.24' Rather, they were acting in their capacity as
employees of the defendants at the time they allegedly witnessed
the anesthesiologists' submissions of fraudulent claims to the
government.242 Thus, this particular situation is not a case in
which nothing interrupted "the causal connection between the
corporation's efforts and the knowledge"2 43 or a situation where
the qui tam relator's knowledge is "unmediated by anything but
[the plaintiffs] own labor."244 Rather, the majority of the personal
knowledge prompting the allegations was not acquired by the
corporation's own labor at all, but rather by its members at a time
when they were not acting in their capacity as the Association's
agents.
For example, in Springfield Terminal Railway Co., a case
that the Eighth Circuit in Nurse Anesthetists cited with favor, the
238. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1049.
239. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14
F.3d 645, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
240. Id.
241. See id. at 1037-40, 1050. The Eighth Circuit stated that the
Association's members "have personal knowledge of defendants' false claims
by virtue of communications with the defendants themselves, participation in
the anesthesia procedures which were later fraudulently billed by the
defendant anesthesiologist, and familiarity with hospital records disclosing
defendants' fraud." Id. at 1050. Personal knowledge acquired by participating
in the anesthesia procedures, for example, was clearly acquired by the
Association's members in the scope of their employment at the hospital, not in
an agency capacity for the Association.
242. See id.
243. Id. at 1049.
244. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Barth v.
Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995)).
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corporate plaintiffs agents acquired knowledge of the defendant's
fraudulent submission of claims while acting as agents for the
corporation. 245 Springfield, the plaintiff, was involved in a labor
dispute before an arbitration panel and brought a FCA qui tam
action alleging an overcharging of the government by one of the
arbitrators.246 Springfield's employees learned of this fraudulent
action while representing Springfield and thus were acting as
Springfield's agents at the time they acquired the knowledge.247
Therefore, Springfield Terminal Railway Co. does not speak to
whether knowledge acquired in one's own employment while not
acting as an agent of the plaintiff corporation can constitute
"direct" knowledge on behalf of the plaintiff corporation.
In addition, both Precision Co. and Federal Recovery Services,
Inc. can be. read as disqualifying a corporate plaintiff as an
original source primarily because the plaintiffs agents acquired
the knowledge underlying the allegations while not acting as
agents for the plaintiff.2 48  In fact, even if the Association's
members in Nurse Anesthetists conducted some of the lawsuit
investigation in their capacity as the Association's members after
the nurses informed the Association of the fraudulent
submissions, the Association's knowledge may still not be "direct."
For example, the Tenth Circuit in Precision Co. held that an
affidavit and numerous statements, interviews, and reports
gathered by the plaintiff corporation itself were "best
characterized as a continuation of, or derived from...
individual investigations" and hence were not sufficient to
"convince us it [the plaintiff corporation] possesses the requisite
direct and independent knowledge of the information on which
its FCA allegations are based."249 Thus, under the analysis
applied by the Tenth Circuit, any partial investigation
conducted on the part of the Association most likely did not
constitute "direct" knowledge of the Association, because the
245. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,
647-49 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
246. Id. at 647-48.
247. Id.
248. See Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc. v. United States, 72 F.3d 447, 452 (5th Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 554
(10th Cir. 1992). The plaintiffs in those cases acquired knowledge regarding the
defendants' fraudulent submissions prior to the corporations' formations, and thus
those plaintiffs could not have been acting as agents of the corporation at the time
they acquired the information. See Fed. Recovery Servs., Inc., 72 F.3d at 452;
Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 554.
249. Precision Co., 971 F.2d at 554.
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vast majority of the knowledge regarding the allegations was
acquired personally by the Association's members while
working in their capacity as employees of the hospitals.250
This does not mean, however, that a corporation can never
have "direct" knowledge and thereby never constitute an
original source. 251 Rather, Springfield Terminal Railway Co.
illustrates that a corporation can have "direct" knowledge of the
underlying allegations of an FCA action.252 Yet in order to have
"direct" knowledge that is "marked by absence of an intervening
agency, instrumentality or influence"2 53 and "unmediated by
anything but [the plaintiffs] own labor,"254 a corporation must
derive its information from people who learned of the
fraudulent actions while acting in their capacity as the
corporation's agents. 255 Because the Association derived its
knowledge from members that acquired their information while
acting as employees of the defendants, 256 Nurse Anesthetists
presents a situation dissimilar to that of Springfield Terminal
Railway Co. and the Association lacks the requisite "direct"
knowledge to constitute an original source. 257
250. See Minn. Ass'n of Nurse Anesthetists v. Allina Health Sys. Corp., 276
F.3d 1032, 1050 (8th Cir. 2002).
251. This conclusion would essentially render the discussion of
corporations as original sources moot, because if a corporation could never
have "direct" knowledge as statutorily required, then a corporation could never
constitute an original source even if Congress had intended "individual" to
include corporations and like entities. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2000); see
also supra Part IV.B (arguing that an entity other than a natural person can
be construed as an "individual" for FCA purposes).
252. See supra notes 245-47 and accompanying text.
253. Nurse Anesthetists, 276 F.3d at 1048 (quoting United States ex rel.
Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d
1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991)).
254. Id. at 1049 (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Barth
v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995)).
255. See supra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
256. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
257. This does not mean, however, that the defendants will not face the
fines imposed by the FCA if the allegations regarding their fraudulent actions
prove true. Rather, the Attorney General could file suit against the
defendants, or the nurses themselves who had independent and direct
knowledge of the allegations underlying the lawsuit could later bring the suit
as proper qui tam relators. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2000); id. § 3730(b); id.
§ 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B); see also United States ex rel. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus.,
Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 554 (10th Cir. 1992) (stating that even though the plaintiff
corporation did not have direct knowledge, "[niotably, Precision is the qui tam
plaintiff in the present action, not William Koch or William Presley"). If only
the actual nurses who acquired the requisite information brought the lawsuit,
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Thus, the Eighth Circuit, by relying upon the Association's
supposed status as an unincorporated association and
Springfield Terminal Railway Co., was incorrect in its ruling
that the Association had "direct" knowledge regarding the
allegations underlying the suit.258 Not only was the Association
in actuality an incorporated entity,259 but it also brought a FCA
claim based on knowledge indirectly acquired from members
who had learned of the defendants' fraudulent conduct while
acting in their capacity as employees of the defendants rather
than as agents of the Association. 260 Therefore, the Association
did not have "direct" knowledge as required by the FCA in
order to qualify as an original source, and the Eighth Circuit
wrongly exercised subject matter jurisdiction over the qui tam
action. 261
CONCLUSION
Nurse Anesthetists addresses issues of national concern to all
taxpayers. As the qui tam provisions of the FCA become
progressively important and the amount of damages qui tam
relators enable the government to recover increases
dramatically,262 an established, consistent interpretation of
these provisions is both necessary and entirely lacking amidst
the various circuit splits. A careful, detailed analysis of each
qui tam subject matter jurisdictional provision is essential to
determine congressional intent and establish fair application of
FCA law. Nurse Anesthetists engaged in a partial study of these
provisions, ultimately holding that the corporate qui tam relator
constituted a proper original source and that the court could
therefore exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
The Eighth Circuit, however, engaged in an inadequate
rather than all the members of the Association, then only those with properly
"direct" knowledge would benefit from the original source exception as
intended by the statute. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B).
258. See supra notes 216-50 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 228-34 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 235-50 and accompanying text.
261. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B).
262. Between 1996 and 2006, qui tam relators are expected to help recover
between $6.9 billion and $9.3 billion. See Taxpayers Against Fraud, Tenth
Anniversary 1986 FCA Amendments: An Assessment of Economic Impact, at
http://www.taf.org/publications/anniversary5.html (Sept. 1996). The amount
saved by the government due to the deterrence of fraud provided by the qui
tam provisions, on the other hand, is much greater and is expected to amount
to between $105.1 billion and $210.1 billion during those same ten years. Id.
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analysis in resolving these important issues. The court should
have conducted a much more detailed examination of the FCA's
language, legislative history, and legislative purpose to assure
that the term "individual" in the original source provision did not
limit original sources to natural persons. Additionally, while the
court was correct in holding that a corporate entity can constitute
an original source, the court ultimately failed to correctly
interpret the jurisdictional requirement that a corporation have
"direct" knowledge. Because the qui tam plaintiff in Nurse
Anesthetists was actually a corporation with members that did not
acquire their knowledge of the fraudulent actions while acting in
an agency capacity for the plaintiff, the court was both factually
and legally incorrect in holding that the plaintiff had "direct"
knowledge and thereby erroneous in exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over the qui tam action. While the FCA does convey
to corporations the right to constitute an original source, that
right is properly limited to those corporations with "direct"
knowledge acquired by people actually acting in their capacity
as the corporations' agents.
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